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Abstract
A weak double-dividend is the proposition that the welfare improvement from
a tax reform, where environmental taxes are used to lower distorting taxes, must be
greater than the welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes
are returned in a lump sum fashion.  A general consensus has emerged that the weak
double-dividend is an uncontroversial idea.  We show in this note that a weak double-
dividend need not hold in a world with multiple distortions.I. Introduction
Environmental economists have focused a great deal of attention in recent
years on the uses of revenues from environmental taxes.  The potential for tax policies
that reduce pollution while raising revenues that might replace other distortionary
taxes holds great appeal for economists and policymakers alike.  The potential for this
dual role for environmental taxes has been incorporated in the idea of an
environmental "double dividend."  This is the idea that imposing an environmental tax
can both improve economic performance and the environment.  Goulder (1995)
provides a useful taxonomy of double dividends as well as an explanation of the
dividend's appeal.
1
Economists have debated the existence of various forms of double dividends
over the past decade.  We refer readers interested in the history of this debate to
Bovenberg (1999) and his excellent summary of the literature.  Here we focus on what
has been a relatively uncontroversial idea: the "weak" double dividend.  A weak
double dividend occurs when the welfare gain achieved by using the environmental
tax proceeds to lower a distorting tax is greater than the gain achieved by distributing
them in a lump sum fashion.
2 A general consensus has emerged that the weak double
dividend holds.
3  In this note we show that in an economy with multiple distortions, a
                                                
1  See Bovenberg (1999) for an update to that literature.
2 In contrast a “strong” double dividend is the case where implementing the environmental tax and
using proceeds to reduce distorting taxes improves welfare without consideration of the environmental
benefits arising from the tax.
3 Starrett (1999) notes, for example, that "this result is quite general and reflects the fact that we are
always better off using the green tax revenue to reduce some other distorting tax rather then [sic] (for2
weak double dividend need not occur.  Our argument is a standard second-best
argument.  In the presence of multiple taxes (other than environmental taxes), the use
of environmental tax revenues to lower one tax (and hence reduce one distortion) may
exacerbate a distortion arising from taxes in some other market.  We illustrate this
with a simple general equilibrium model that highlights the competing distortions in a
particularly transparent way.
II. Model
In this section, we present a simple analytic general equilibrium model to show
that the weak double-dividend need not hold.  While the weak double-dividend will
hold true in a world with only one (non-environmental) distorting tax, it will not
necessarily be true in a more general economy.
Our model is particularly simple.  There are two goods (X and Y), both of
which are produced with labor (L).  Good Y creates pollution (Z) as a by-product of
the production process.  As noted elsewhere (see Fullerton and Metcalf (2001)), we
can model pollution as an input into the production process.  Without loss of
generality, we can also associate some labor with pollution.  This simply assures an
interior solution to the model:
(1) X = LX
(2) Y = F(LY, Z)
                                                                                                                                            
example) returning it in a lump sum manner." (p. 36)  See also the discussion in Goulder (1995) on
pages 159-161.3
where F is a constant returns to scale production function.  We assume that one unit of
labor is associated with each unit of pollution so that the resource constraint is
(3) L = LX + LY + Z
Utility of a representative agent is a function of consumption of the two goods,
leisure (V) and environmental quality (E):
(4) U(X,Y,V;E)  where E=e(Z), e' < 0.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
(5) pXX + pYY = L + T
where pX and pY are the consumer prices for X and Y, the gross wage rate equals 1
(labor is taken as the numeraire good) and T is a lump-sum transfer.  Leisure and labor
sum to a fixed time endowment.  Consumer prices are related to producer prices as
follows:
(6a) pX = 1 + tX
(6b) pY = qY(1+tY)
(6c) pZ = 1 + tZ
where tx and tz are commodity taxes levied on goods X and Y, respectively, to raise
revenue, and tz is an environmental tax, levied on Z.  Given the technology, the
producer prices of X and Z always equal 1 and we normalize the producer price of Y
(qY) so that it equals 1 prior to the imposition of an environmental tax.  The
environmental tax is equal to zero initially.  Consumer behavior can be represented by4
the following two equations under the assumption that L and E are weakly separable
from each other and from (X,Y) and that utility over (X, Y) is homothetic
4:
(7) ) p ˆ p ˆ ( σ Y ˆ X ˆ
X Y c − = −
(8) () () Y X p ˆ 1 p ˆ ε L ˆ φ φ− + − =
where   C σ  is the elasticity of substitution between X and Y in consumption, ε  is the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity and  φ  is the share of consumer expenditure on
X.  A hat over a variable indicates a percentage change.  In other words,  X
dX X = ˆ .
(For taxes and transfers below, we will define  () t
dt t + = 1
ˆ  and  dT T = ˆ .)  Equation (7)
says that substitution between X and Y depends on relative prices for X and Y and
C σ , while equation (8) relates labor supply to the real net wage.  The nominal wage is
1 and the real wage equals the nominal wage divided by a price index based on the
consumer prices of X and Y.
The government budget constraint is given by
(9) tXX + tYqYY + tZZ = T,
again noting that tZ initially equals zero.  Below, we discuss how taxes and transfers
adjust to maintain equation (9) as the environmental tax is levied.
Finally, pollution abatement can be captured in the production function for Y
by
                                                
4   These assumptions are commonly made as a "neutral" stance assumption.5
(10) Z Y Y t ˆ σ Z ˆ L ˆ = −
where  Y σ is the elasticity of substitution between clean labor and pollution in
production.
We consider three different experiments.  In each, we introduce a small
environmental tax ( 0 t ˆ
Z > ) and let one of the three following variables adjust
endogenously:  Y X t ˆ   , t ˆ   , T ˆ .  We can then compare the change in utility across policy































where  λ  is the private marginal utility of income and  
λ
µ





− ≡  is the social
marginal damages of pollution.
5  The left hand side of equation (11) gives the change








 as a percentage of the value of resources used in
production (L).  In other words, it expresses the dollar value of the utility change as a
percentage of GNP.
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5  Equation (11) is derived by totally differentiating the utility function, substituting in the consumer’s
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= θ .  Next, we can differentiate the three price expressions in
equation (6) to obtain
(14)
∧ ∧
= X X t p
(15)
∧ ∧ ∧




= Z Z t p .























) 1 , (  where  
*
Z L  and  
* Z  are the optimal (and
observed) levels of labor input and pollution used in the production of Y.  These
equalities follow since the production function is constant returns to scale.













Finally, we can differentiate the resource constraint (equation (3)) to obtain7
(17)




























If we substitute equations (14), (15'), and (16) into equations (7), (8), (12), and (13),
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 + + − + +
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ˆ
) 1 ( ) ( θ φ θ φ .
Equations (18) - (21) along with (10) and (17) are a system of six linear equations in
six unknowns.  The endogenous variables are 
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
Z L L Y X Y , , , , , and one of the following
three variables 
∧ ∧ ∧
Y X t t T , ,  while  
∧
Z t  is the exogenous variable.
As we consider implementing a small tax on pollution (
∧
Z t > 0), we have a
number of possible uses of revenues.  Table 1 outlines the three policies we consider:
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE8
A weak double dividend occurs when the welfare gains from policies 2 or 3 are
greater than the welfare gains from the first policy
6.  We next show that the weak
double dividend need not hold.
III. Results
We impose a small environmental tax (starting at a zero tax rate) and solve the
general equilibrium model described above and use equation (11) to measure the
welfare impact of the policy.  We note our parameter assumptions in Table 2.  These
parameter assumptions are based on Fullerton and Metcalf (2001).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 reports the welfare gains (or losses) for a small environmental tax with
proceeds returned lump sum for various configurations of initial tax rates. We simulate
an environmental tax rate equal to ten percent of the producer price of pollution
() 1 . 0 ˆ = Z t .  In general the tax is welfare enhancing unless the commodity tax on the
polluting good is disproportionately larger than the tax on the  non-polluting good.
This follows since the pollution tax increases the cost of the polluting good and so
increases the intercommodity distortion between goods X and Y that exists initially
because of the commodity tax.  Note that the welfare losses can result from the
increased wedge between the prices of X and Y despite first-order gains from reduced
pollution.
7
                                                
6 Alternatively, the welfare loss from policies 2 or 3 are less than the welfare loss from policy 1.
7 Higher levels of taxation on Y than X are not necessary to effect a welfare loss as Table 3 shows in the
bottom right corner.  High levels of overall taxation exacerbate the labor-leisure distortion and can also9
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 conducts a similar simulation in which the environmental taxes are used to
lower taxes on X.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Again, the environmental tax raises welfare unless the polluting good is taxed more
heavily than the non-polluting good.  Note that the welfare change is constant so long
as the two goods are taxed at the same rate.  This follows because of our assumption
of weak separability from leisure along with homotheticity.  In such a case, the
optimal tax is a uniform tax on commodities or equivalently a tax on labor in this
model (see Deaton (1979)).  Given the optimal construction of  the tax system, the
change in the tax on pollution has first order welfare effects only through changes in
environmental quality.
8
Next we compare the welfare gains from returning the environmental tax by
lowering the tax on the clean good (X) versus increasing the lump-sum transfer.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
A weak double dividend occurs in cases where entries in Table 5 are positive.  This
table is constructed by subtracting entries in Table 3 from the corresponding entries in
                                                                                                                                            
bring about a welfare loss despite the environmental gains.  These results illustrate the point by
Sandmo (1975) that the optimal environmental commodity tax is a weighted average of a Ramsey
component and an environmental component.  As tax distortions increase, Sandmo observed, the weight
on the Ramsey component rises.  In this model, the Ramsey component pushes us towards uniform
taxation of X and Y and any tax that deviates from uniform taxation would be welfare reducing.













 or .3 percent.10
Table 4.  The first row is the usual case considered in the literature when there is only
one distortionary tax on the non-polluting commodity.  In this case, the weak double
dividend holds.  When the initial tax on the polluting good is sufficiently higher than
the tax on the non-polluting good, however, a weak double dividend will not hold.  In
other words, it will be better to return the environmental proceeds lump-sum rather
than use them to reduce distorting taxes.
Table 6 shows that this result is not due to the particular commodity tax chosen
to be lowered in response to the environmental levy.  Now we use the proceeds to
lower the commodity tax on the polluting good.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Again, the weak double dividend fails if the environmental tax revenues are used to
reduce the commodity tax on the good currently taxed at a lower rate.
9
  In general if the environmental tax revenue is used to reduce the differential
between two distorting taxes then a weak double dividend occurs. If the recycling
increases the difference between existing distortions then recycling is welfare
worsening compared with lump sum recycling even if it reduces an existing distortion
(here between leisure and labor).  In other words, in an economy with multiple
distortions one must choose carefully which distortions to reduce, or one can do worse
than a lump sum redistribution. Put simply, there is no theoretical basis to conclude
that  a weak double dividend must exist.
                                                
9   These qualitative results hold over any reasonable range of estimates for parameter values in Table 2.11
IV. Conclusion
We have shown in a simple analytic general equilibrium model that the weak
double dividend does not hold unambiguously.  Relative tax distortions play an
important role in this result.  Revenue recycling can be welfare worsening if it
increases the relative distortion among goods even if it reduces an existing distortion.
This suggests that a careful assessment of just which distortions to reduce is necessary
or one can do worse than lump sum recycling.  While this result is of theoretical
interest, it turns out also to be of important practical interest.  In Babiker, Metcalf and
Reilly (forthcoming), we use a large-scale computable general equilibrium model to
demonstrate that the weak double dividend is unlikely to hold for a number of
European countries when policies are considered to reduce carbon emissions.  Thus
the results of this paper should be considered in discussions of international policies to
combat global warming.12
Table 1: Policy scenarios
Policy Hold Fixed Adjust
1t X, tY T
2t Y, T tX
3t X, T tY















Table 3. Lump sum return of tax
tX
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0.25% 0.32% 0.39% 0.47% 0.56%
0.1 0.05% 0.13% 0.20% 0.28% 0.36%
0.2 -0.15% -0.07% 0.01% 0.09% 0.17%
0.3 -0.35% -0.27% -0.19% -0.11% -0.03%
tY
0.4 -0.55% -0.48% -0.40% -0.32% -0.23%
Welfare impact of a new environmental tax for different initial tax rates on X
and Y13
Table 4. Reduction in tax on clean good
tX
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0.30% 0.60% 0.91% 1.24% 1.57%
0.1 0.00% 0.30% 0.61% 0.94% 1.27%
0.2 -0.32% -0.01% 0.30% 0.62% 0.96%
0.3 -0.64% -0.34% -0.02% 0.30% 0.63%
tY
0.4 -0.97% -0.67% -0.35% -0.03% 0.30%
Welfare impact of a new environmental tax for different initial tax rates on X
and Y
Table 5.  Weak double-dividend calculation
tX
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0.054% 0.283% 0.520% 0.764% 1.019%
0.1 -0.056% 0.174% 0.411% 0.655% 0.909%
0.2 -0.172% 0.058% 0.294% 0.538% 0.790%
0.3 -0.293% -0.064% 0.172% 0.414% 0.664%
tY
0.4 -0.415% -0.188% 0.046% 0.286% 0.534%
Welfare gain in case where environmental tax used to lower tax on X less
welfare gain in case where environmental tax used to increase lump-sum
transfer.
Table 6.  Alternative weak double dividend calculation
tX
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 -0.096% -0.168% -0.244% -0.324% -0.406%
0.1 0.097% 0.024% -0.053% -0.132% -0.214%
0.2 0.296% 0.221% 0.144% 0.064% -0.019%
0.3 0.498% 0.423% 0.345% 0.264% 0.181%
tY
0.4 0.705% 0.628% 0.549% 0.468% 0.384%
Welfare gain in case where environmental tax used to lower tax on Y less
welfare gain in case where environmental tax used to increase lump-sum
transfer.14
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